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"...it is expected that the USSR will submit positive proposals for the solution of the German crisis.... In this respect, the USSR has no need to revise her policy—aiming, as it does, at (1) the preservation of German unity, (2) the early conclusion of a peace treaty with an all-German government, and (3) the withdrawal of the occupation troops within a fixed period after the conclusion of a treaty." (Commentary by Erika Rowald, Soviet-controlled Leipzig, 14 May 1949)

Interpretation: The above three points, also the expressed aims of the Soviet-Zone German People's Congress, are repeatedly reiterated over the weekend by the Soviet-controlled German radios. These aims are the main elements of the campaign for all-German "joint consultations" to prepare "German expectations" for submission to the OCM Conference; and they are given at least tacit approval in Moscow's publicity devoted to the campaign. Yalta and Potsdam are occasionally cited by the Soviet radio as necessary bases for OCM agreement. Moscow also gives some attention to the specific issues of demarcification, demilitarization, and the Ruhr industrial war potential--but not in the context of comment about the OCM meeting.

The broadcast of an IZVESTIA editorial, the weekend's major Soviet commentary received on the GFM Conference, gives sole credit to the USSR for the lifting of the blockade and the convening of the GFM; it also warns against implied Western use of "dictatorial methods" at the Conference. Some attention is given to the Anglo-U.S.-French "political circles" who are still trying "to confuse the public and build up an unfavorable atmosphere about the coming session." In the latter context, IZVESTIA also places "the hasty adoption of the so-called Bonn Constitution"—a theme that is repeated by practically all monitored Satellite media. Moscow has not yet commented on what France's Duclos calls the "famous 'Kennan Plan' involving evacuation of Soviet and French troops from Germany, with only Truman's and Bevin's soldiers remaining." But the French Communist HUMAINE says that "it shows the Western desire to spread confusion and create as much difficulty as possible on the eve of the Four-Power Conference"; and, in a similar context, Duclos quotes a statement by Stalin to the effect that the Western governments only want "conversations on an agreement or collaboration in order to bring about the failure of this agreement and make the USSR responsible for this failure, while trying to prove the impossibility of cooperation with the USSR."

ANALYSIS "CONFIRMED" WESTERN CONSENT TO GFM MEETING: IZVESTIA, echoed by monitored Satellite broadcasts, attributes the GFM meeting to "the course of events (which) confirmed the correctness of the Potsdam decision and compelled the Western powers to give their consent to a meeting...." Thus, the correctness of the Soviet position is also vindicated. IZVESTIA also interprets the "enthusiastic" international reaction as proof of "the generally known fact that only a small group is interested in international tension,... (that) it is only the warmakers with their efforts to launch another war that are most afraid of agreements and co-operation with the Soviet Union." "It was not the fault of the Soviet Union," says

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IZVESTIA, that its call "for a return to Four-Power talks on German problems... was rejected by the Western Powers last year."

THE CONFERENCE ISSUES: Except for criticism of the "attempted" Bonn "fait accompli" and tacit approval of the German People's Congress' campaign* for German unity, an early peace treaty, and withdrawal of troops, monitored Soviet broadcasts do not give explicit attention to possible Conference issues. Listeners are reminded of Yalta and Potsdam. And IZVESTIA reiterates the Soviet contention that "the Berlin question is only part of the whole German problem, and consequently cannot be settled apart from the questions relating to Germany." That the Soviet Union will be concerned about the reaction of world public opinion to the CFM debates is suggested by a Warsaw broadcast that speaks of the "uneasiness in the ranks of the warmongers... caused by the thought of concrete proposals which the USSR will present to the Paris Conference. The British and U.S. ruling circles seem to fear that the constructive Soviet proposals which will be made... might win the support of world public opinion."

CONFERENCE PROSPECTS: Although IZVESTIA grants that the lifting of the blockade and the convening of the CFM "may prove to be a first step toward further agreements," it warns:

"But it would be ridiculous and naive to think that the method of dictating can be used in the coming talks, which is undoubtedly the dream of certain circles, the most rabid supporters of aggressive military and political blocs and alliances. If any progress is to be made at the coming session of the CFM, this method must be discarded.

"It should be noted that those political circles in the U.S., Britain, and France which are strongly opposed to any agreement with the Soviet Union... are still taking steps through the press they control to confuse the public and build up an unfavorable atmosphere about the coming session. ... Apparently the same aim is pursued by the efforts... to speed the formation of a West German state, expressed in the hasty adoption of the so-called Bonn Constitution...."

And another Soviet radio broadcast quotes the "democratic Berlin press" to the effect that "the Bonn decision is a barrier on the path of the talks to take place in Paris." Some Satellite radio broadcasts are explicitly "suspicious" of Western "sincerity." The Prague radio, for example, interprets the Bonn Constitution as "clear proof that some subversive circles in the West wish to make sure beforehand of the failure of the Paris meeting by removing the prerequisites of an understanding." It also notes "another collection of (Bevin-Churchill) slanders and invectives against the Soviet Union," and cites an allegedly pessimistic BBC comment about the Conference outcome as confirmation of the saying that "the wish is father to the thought. There are people in London, Washington, and Paris who stand and fall with the cold war. The end of the cold war would mean also their disappearance. That is why... they fear concord and peace." But Prague concludes that they "form only an insignificant minority and that no diplomatic intrigues can arrest the advance and prevent the eventual victory of the forces of peace."

* Of peripheral interest in this connection, it may be noted that a Moscow broadcast to Germany on "The Attitude of British Conservatives to Germany and Germans" quotes from Lord Vansittart's book, LESSONS OF MY LIFE, in which he "openly admitted his hatred for everything German."

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